torsdag 21 november 2013

The Cyprus Case - BEPS illustrated

WebJournal on International Taxation in Sweden no 4/2013

The Cyprus case1 – BEPS illustrated.
 
by Peter Sundgren
 

Introduction

BEPS, Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, is on everybody's lips these days. Just recently the G 20 ”banged its fists” mandating that this kind of tax behavior must be stopped.
 
The Salénhuset AB case, an advance ruling, delivered by the Swedish Supreme Administrative Court (SAC) case 4799-10, (Billum, Dexe, Jermsten, Stenman, Saldén Enerus) 30 May 2012 is an illustrative example of BEPS.

The case has stirred up a lot of frustration within the Swedish international tax community, the main reason being that the decision, invoking the Swedish general anti avoidance regulation GAAR, disqualified the tax strategy set up by Salénhuset AB giving rise to very substantial sums of tax to be paid by not only Salénhuset but also by a number of other large real property holding companies in Sweden. The Swedish Tax Administrations has identified some 100 cases which according to Dagens Industri, June 18 2012, may trigger tax payments of 15 – 20 billion SEK.

In what seemed to be a justification and defence of the tax strategy that had been adopted, Mr, Martin Nilsson, Chief Tax Partner of Mannheimer Swartling Law firm, published a nine page article in Svensk Skattetidning number 4/2012 p. 397 sharply criticizing the SAC for its decision. Also, Mr. Per Holstad of Skeppsbron Skatt has written a very critical article in Skattenytt page 568/2012. In contrast I wrote a quite sympathetic – and pro fiscal - report about the case titled ”Satisfactory outcome of the Cyprus case” (Välkommen utgång i Cypernmålet.) where I took issue with and rejected some of Mr. Nilssons arguments, in particular his ideas regarding the effect of EU law considerations. It is written in Swedish and available on my blog www.petersundgren.blogspot.com. July 2012. (The article had previously been denied publication by the editorial board of Svensk Skattetidning, a board of which, incidentally, Martin Nilsson is a member.)

In addition to disqualifying Salénhuset AB's tax avoidance scheme both the Advance Rulings Board (ARB) (Skatterättsnämnden) and the SAC also rejected the company's suggestion that the application of the Swedish GAAR violated the principle of free establishment under the EU Treaty. And this is what the rest of this article is all about.

As just mentioned I gave attention to this question also in my earlier blog article but new light has been shed on this matter since I obtained from the SAC a copy of a legal opinion on this matter written by one of Sweden's leading experts on EU tax law, Mr Björn Westberg, Doctor at Law and Professor of Fiscal Law at the Jönköping International Business School. Considering that both the ARB's and Mr. Westberg's opinions are of interest to a wider public I have been spurred to write this (second) article on Salénhuset AB and this time in English.

The tax avoidance strategy
 
Salénhuset AB's plan was as follows: The company owned real property situated in Sweden which it intended to sell to an outside buyer, a transaction which which would give rise to a substantial gain and which of course would also give rise to normal Swedish business taxation at about 25% tax. In order to avoid paying this tax Salénhuset AB formed a wholly owned Cyprus company, Candice Ltd. Together, Salenhuset AB and Cancice Ltd. then set up a Swedish partnership, which under Swedish tax law is a transparent and non- taxable entity, in which Candice Ltd. would hold a 99.9 percent stake and Salénhuset AB the resulting 0.1 percent. Salénhuset AB would then sell its real property to the partnership which under Swedish tax law regarding transfers of assets between companies in the same group can be done at submarket value aquisition cost thus deferring a taxation of the capital gain on the sale. Subsequently Salénhuset AB and Candice Ltd would sell their shares in the partnership to the outside buyer. The sale by Candice Ltd would be tax free in Cyprus and also exempted from tax in Sweden under Swedish domestic tax law. (Mr. Westberg has erroneously stated that Candice Ltd's. tax exemption in Sweden is due to the tax treaty between Sweden and Cyprus.) The only tax to be collected from this sale of the shares in the partnership would thus be the Swedish business tax on the 0.1 percent of the shares held by Salénhuset AB. Thereafter, which however was never mentioned nor discussed in the case, the profit collected by Candice Ltd. on its 99.9 percent of the sale of its Swedish partnership, would be repatriated back to Salénhuset AB a transaction that also would be tax free in both Cyprus and Sweden. More hereinafter. Thus, the combined tax to be paid under this sequence of transactions also upon repatriation to Sweden of the capital gain/profit made by Candice Ltd. would only be the above mentioned Swedish business tax on 0.1 percent of the market value of the sale of the partnership shares owned by Salénhuset AB. We are thus witnessing a BEPS strategy where 99.9 percent of a Swedish source tax base is eroded and the profit shifted in three taxfree stages ,first into a tax transparent partnership in Sweden, then into a tax exempt entity in a tax haven and ultimately repatriated back to the original owner of the real property in Sweden.

The main issue of the case, as afore mentioned, was whether or not the Swedish GAAR could be invoked against this tax setup. Both the ARB and, on appeal, the SAC found unanimously that such was the case, i.e the GAAR was applicable with the consequence that Salénhuset AB was denied the relief of the submarket transfer of the real property to the partnership. The company would thus be taxed at full market value for the transfer of the real property to the partnership.

The ARB's ruling regarding EU law issue.

If the ARB should apply the GAAR, Salénhuset AB also requested a ruling whether or not this would violate the EU Treaty's principle of free establishment in the Community.

On this issue the ARB ruled as follows: ”The ARB's application of the anti avoidance rule means that the transfer of the real property to the partnership is deemed to have taken place at market value of the property. The question arises whether a corresponding taxation would arise if the dominating owner of the partnership were a Swedish company instead of a Cyprus company.
 
In determing whether a treatment to the detriment of the tax payer (negativ särbehandling) has ocurred, the comparison, according to the ARB, must comprise both the sale of the real property to the partnership and the alienation of the shares of the partnership. If the dominating owner had been a Swedish company, the capital gains taxation of the alienation of the shares to an external buyer would have taken place according to normal rules (giving rise to taxation in Sweden – my clarification). The tax relief provided by the sub market price of the sale would then be the basis for this taxation. Under such circumstances the ARB considers that the cross-border transaction does not give rise to any detrimental tax treatment of the tax payer.”

Mr Westberg's legal opinion regarding the EU law issue.

In appealing this ruling to the SAC Salénhuset AB submitted a legal opinion by the above mentioned Mr Björn Westberg, He wrote as follows, (my translation):
-------------------------------------------------------------------------

Björn Westberg   Legal opinion 2011-08-01

Statement regarding the EU law consequences of decision 73-09/D by the Advance (Tax) Rulings Board, ARB, (Skatterättsnämnden) 2010-07-02.

 
1.Assignment
 
Bill Andréasson, barrister, has solicited me to determine whether ruling 73-09/D delivered by the ARB 2010-07-02 is compatible with the the principles and regulations of EU law. My opinion makes reference to the notations of the ruling.

X AB (=Salénhuset AB, my comment)) is a Swedish comany (limited) , that holds 0.1 percent of a Swedish partnership together with a wholly owned Cyprus company, Y Ltd (=Candice Ltd., my comment), holding the remaining 99.9 percent of the partnership. X AB intends to transfer Swedish real property to the partnership in accordance with the rules allowing a deferral of taxation on intra group transfers of assets (sub market price transfers) (=underprisöverlåtelser).

2. Summary

In my opinion any ruling on Swedish law must always take into consideration the basic principles of EU law. Both articles 43 EG and 48 EG regarding free establishments within the Community and article 58 EG on free capital transfers constitute an obstacle to the the ARB's interpretation of Swedish national law. The sub marketprice transfer of assets by a Swedish company to a Swedish (group) partnership of which 99.9 percent is held by a company established under the rules of another EU member state where it has its legal seat, would, according to the ARB's decision, upon the subsequent sale by X AB of its 0.1 percent holding in the partnership, trigger full taxation of X AB of the sub market price transfer to the partnership instead of being taxed only of its 0.1 percent holding of the partnership. The consequence hereof sets aside the normally applicable rules of (tax free) intra group sub market transfers as X AB is held liable to tax for the full market value of the real property transferred to the partnership. The ruling primarily addresses the right of free establishment (within the EU).2

In my opinion the legal situation is completely clear. The ruling by the ARB is in violation of the principles of free establishment under the Treaty.3 If the Supreme Administrative Court, (the SAC), does not share my opinion of the EU legal aspects, there is an obligation for it under article 267 of the EU Treaty to apply for an advance ruling from from the EU Court, as such an interpretation would violate established practise.

 
3. The ARB's decision

The ARB has determined that the General Anti Avoidance Regulation (GAAR) (1995:575) is applicable with the motivation that ” (at) the subsequent sale of the shares of the partnership at market price almost the whole capital gain will escape taxation as Y Ltd, is not liable to taxation in Sweden nor in Cyprus. This has the additional effect that the corresponding share of the tax relief that follows from the deferred tax of the submarket transfer of the real property to the partnersip becomes final.” The ARB adds, that ”due to the ownership conditions of the partnership the intra group sale has the effect that nearly the whole gain is transferred from X (AB) to Y (Ltd.). The final tax relief for the group arises because Y (Ltd.) is not liable to capital gains taxation on its sale of its share of the partnership. Thus, the ARB considers that the final tax relief arising from the procedure is in violation of the purposes of the rules on the sub market price transfers (between group companies). Therefor, also the conditions for application of 2 § 4 of the GAAR are satisfied”. The reasoning of the ARB leads to an unequal treatment compared to the situation where the partnership had been owned by Swedish individuals or legal persons. In such cases each share owner is taxed on its part of the transferred shares where the GAAR would not have been applicable. In its ruling the ARB invalidates the transfer by X AB of the real property to the partnership under the sub market price transfers regulations and levies tax on X AB at full market price, i.e. a clear unequal treatment compared to a situation where there would have been only Swedish holders of shares in the partnership.

The ARB declares that Y Ltd. is not liable to taxation in Sweden nor in its domestic jurisdiction. It is true that Y Ltd. is not subject to Swedish taxation for the sale of its shares in the partnership, but this is due to the pertinent tax treaty and domestic Swedish law. According to the Sweden-Cyprus tax treaty of 1989, article 13.1, gains arising from the alienation of shares in a company whose main assets consist of real property may be taxed in the State where the property is situated. However, as Y Ltd.'s shares in the partnership are not allocated to a permanent establishment in Sweden there is no justification for taxation in Sweden. Whether or not Cyprus taxes the relevant gains is irrelevant. Nevertheless, the ARB ought to have reported the legal basis for the non-taxation of Y Ltd. in its home jurisdiction. Established practise by the EU Court shows that congruence of the national systems in cases similar to the present one is not achieved by correcting mechanisms, in this case by not applying the rules on sub market price transfers, but by the result of the reciprocate treatment of the tax treaty of the Contracting States. The EU Court has pointed out that where ”Sweden has concluded tax treaties with other Member States the congruence in the case is upheld by the domestic court not at the individual level by strict accordance between the deferral of the taxation of the market price and the final taxation thereof, but on another level by the reciprocity between the Contracting States of the rules applied. These rules are laid down in such treaties on the basis of forces of attraction with the purpose of dividing the taxing rights which the Contracting Staets are free to determine as long as, as the case at the national court, no EU laws have been issued.”4 The court case refers to a deferral of taxation, but the basic EU law principles laid down therein are wholly applicable to sub market price transfers of the kind occurring in the X AB and Y Ltd. Case.

The ARB points out that the circumstances in the pertinent case in its essential parts correspond to those of (SAC ruling) RÅ 2009 not 86 where the Court found that the procedure violated the purposes of the legislation on sub market price intra group transfers. Thus one can establish that the ARB compares different situations. The conclusion, therefor, is in conflict with the principles under EU law of equal treatment.The prohibition against discrimination, which also is embedded in the principle of equal treatment, suggests that comparable situations are to be treated equally, unless a separate treatment is objectivly justified. Comparable situations may not be treated differently, and different situations may not be treated in the same way unless for special reasons. In the pertinent case one must allways try to find similar cases.5 RÅ 2009 not. 86 describes a purely Swedish situation. The pertinent case addresses a situation about a final tax relief of a kind that differs from the domestic case explored in RÅ 2009 not 86.

4. Basic EU law principles.

The decision by the ARB constitutes a clear restriction on free establishment as expressed in article 43 of the EU Treaty. The different treatment is expressed as a denial of the application of the rules on sub market price intra group transfers for tax purposes when the gain on the subsequent alienation of the shares of the Cypriot shareholder cannot be taxed in Sweden. The ARB notes: ”If the dominating shareholder had been a Swedish company the taxation of the capital gain on the sale of the shares to an independent buyer would be governed by ordinary rules. The tax relief allowed at the (preceeding) sub market price intra group transfer would then provide the base for the taxation.” The different treatment of transactions carried out by a shareholder of another Member State would thereby be clearly demonstrated. The result is a clear difference of tax treatment in the Member State, in this case Sweden, where the sub market price intra group transaction occurs. In contrast to firmly established practise the decision restricts the freedom of establishment for the Swedish company X, who wholly owns the shares of the Cypriot company Y Ltd. X AB unquestionably can influence the decisions of Y Ltd. and can control its activities.6

5. Can the ARB's interpretation of national law be justified?

Established practise by the EU Court has demonstrated in which situations a restriction of the freedom of establishment can be justified in consideration of public interest.7 Such restrictions may be implemented if either a carefully conducted apportionment of the tax base is disrupted or as a means to counteract tax avoidance. The restrictions must, however, be justified for the safeguarding of the purpose of the legislation and must nt obe too far reaching in that respect 8

The first mentioned case focuses on the principle that costs should primarily be borne by the member state where the income is generated.9 The EU Court has literally pointed out, ”that there must be a direct connexion between the pertinent advantage and and the compensation therefor by the tax levy”,10 Such connection, however, does not exist in this case. The reduction of the Swedish tax that could follow where a shareholder of other member states were not treated in the same way as a Swedish shareholder cannot ”be considered as any such obliging concern of public interest that can justify a separate treatment that violates article 43... Such a purpose is namely of a pure economic character and cannot, according to established practise, be considered as an obliging public interest concern”.11 Nor does the case describe a situation where a parent company may choose if taxation shall take place in one or the other member state, which according to the EU Court under certain circumstances can justify the national tax treatment.12 ”If it were granted that the residence state could allways invoke separate treatment merely because a company has its seat in another member state, it would render article 43 EG completely meaningless.”13

The other case focuses on ”ficticous structures used for the purpose of eluding the legislation of the member state.”14 To invoke taxation in accordance with the general anti avoidance regulation amounts to a separate treatment of a company than with a wholly owned subsidiary established in another member state. According to established practise by the EU Court a general presumption for tax avoidance cannot be based on the fact that the subsidiary is established in another member state. It cannot justify (the application of) a provision that infringes upon basic princples of freedom guaranteed by the Treaty.15 Moreover, measures considered to safeguard the domestic tax base must also take into account the principles of proportionality of the EU law. 16 The rules on sub market price intra group transfers have been imposed to enable changes of group structures by preventing a triggering of taxation on such measures. As demonstrated by the ARB tha application of the general anti avoidance regulations will prevent the the profits of transactions carried out in complete accordance with the rules on sub market price intra group transfers from becoming untaxed. The concluding argument is comes to expression by the ARB itself when stating that ”the final tax relief for the group occurs because Y Ltd. is not liable to taxation for its gain of the share of the partnership.”. Thus, the ARB deviates from established practise laid down by the EU Court.

In this case the decision by the ARB amounts to a handicap for the Swedish parent company which, by the application of the general anti avoidance regulations, is taxed for the full market price on the transfer of real property to the jointly held partnership based on the fact that the wholly owned Cypriot company on the (subsequent) transfer of its shares in the partnership would ot be subject to tax, at least not in Sweden. This constitutes a clear obstacle to establishments in another member state. ”According to firm practise this also means that even if the purpose of the rules on free establishment in the Treaty, according to its wording, is to secure national treatment in the receiving member state, these rules also prohibit the source member state from preventing a member state citizen or company festablished under the laws of the source member state from setting up (a business) in another member state.”17 A taxation of this kind constitutes in this case a serious obstacle to company restructurings involving subsidiaries in other member states.

Björn Westberg
Doctor at Law, Professor of Fiscal Law
 
2 See for instance C-524/04 Thin Cap Group Litigation, REG 2007 p. I-2107, p.27; C 102/05 A och B (Skatteverket mot A och B), REG 2007 s I-3871, p. 27
3. See primarily case C-436/00 X and Y (X and Y versus Tax Administration), REG 2002 s. I.10829, p. 65, 70, 74 and 75; see also case C-311/08 SGI (Societé de Gestion Industrielle SA (SGI) versus Belgian State), REG 2010 s. I-0000, p. 28, 36 and 38-40, where the EU Court at p. 40 clearly has indicated that the company seat is decisive for determining the force of attraction to the legal system of a member state.
4See case C-436/00 X and Y, REG 2002 s. I-10829, p.53; see also case C 80/94, Wielockx, REG 1995 s.I-2493, p. 24
5For instance, when determining the tax base for value added tax purposes transactions at no compensation shall not be compared to transactions at levels below or above market price, see case C-250/10 Campsa Estaciones de Servicio, REG 2011 s. I-0000, p. 30; see also e.g. Påhlsson, Robert, Likhet inför skattelag – likhetsprincipen och konstruktionen av jämförbarhet i skatterätten (2007), s. 108-109.
6See primarily case C-436/00 X and Y, REG 2002 s. I-10829 p. 24-37 and 39
7E.g. See case C-311/08 SGI, REG 2010 s. I-0000, p. 56, 61, 63, 65 and 69.
8See case C-231/05 OY AA, REG 2007 s. I- I-6373, p. 44
9A disallowance of the deduction could be justified in such a situation, see e.g.case C-204/90 Bachmann, REG 1992 s, I- I-249, p. 28, 32 and 37
10See case C-96/08 CIBA, REG 2010 s. I-0000, p. 47
11See case C-436/00 X and Y, REG 2002 s. I-10829 p. 50; see also cases C-264/96 ICI, REG 1998 s. I 4695, p. 28; C-307/97 Saint-Gobain ZN, REG 1999 s. I-6161, p. 50; C-35/98 Verkooijen, REG 2000, s. I-4071, p. 48; the combined cases C 397/98 and C 410/98 Metallgesellschaft, REG 2001, s. I-1727, p. 59
12See e.g. Cases C-446/03 Marks & Spencer, REG 2007, s. I-6373 REG p. 46; C 231/05 OY AA, REG 2007 s. I-I-6373, p. 55; C 311/08 SGI, REG 2010 s. I-6373, p. 62; C-337/08 X Holding, REG 2010 s. I-0000 p. 29.
13See case C-337/08, X Holding, REG 2010 s. I-0000, p. 23
14See case C-311/08 SGI, REG 2010 s. I-0000, p. 65; C-446/03 Marks & Spencer, REG 2007, s. I-6373 p.57.
15My expression is only an adaption to this case of the language in case C-436/00 X and Y, REG 2002 s, I-10829, p. 61-62, see also case C-478/98 The Commission versus Belgium, REG 2000, s. I-7587, p. 45
16See e.g. Case C-028/95 Leur-Bloem, REG 1997 s. I-4161, p. 44; C-324/00 Lankhorst-Hohorst, REG 2002 s. I-11779, p. 33.
17See case C-102/05 A and B (Tax Administration versus A and B), REG 2007 s.I-3871, p. 24



The  SAC ruling.

The SAC, as mentioned above, also invoked the Swedish GAAR. But even before doing so, and seemingly ignoring completely all the intellectual effort put into this matter by both the ARB and Mr Westberg, the SAC completely dismissed the whole problem regarding the EU law matter. Over three lines of text one reads: ”The SAC finds that nothing of importance has been demonstrated to suggest any involvment in the case of EU law. The motion that a ruling hereon should be requested from the European Court of Justice is therefor rejected.” Full stop.
No one to my knowledge has ventured to give an explanation of this peculiar ruling. My own interpretation is simply that the matter concerns a Swedish company that sells real property situated in Sweden to a Swedish partnership and that, therefor, this does not involve any other state than Sweden. One can of course understand that it would have been very embarrassing for the SAC if it had submitted the case to the ECJ and then have it returned with their own explanation i.e. that the matter had nothing to do with EU law! It is, however, highly unsatisfactory that the SAC has not given a proper explanation of its ruling and one can agree with Martin Nilsson's statement – if not its rhetoric - in his above mentioned article that the SAC ”again has created substantial uncertainty of the legal situation and that it does not live up to the standards that can be expected from a supreme court”. But back to the ARB's decision and Mr. Westberg's objections thereto: The task to be fullfilled is to establish whether the tax payer(s) by the application of the Swedish GAAR has suffered a negative or detrimental tax treatment (negativ särbehandling) according to EU law, depriving them in this case of a relief that follows from a deferral of tax under our rules allowing submarket price sales of assets between group companies. Under general common market principles, as considered by Mr. Westberg, such deferral of taxation must be granted also when the pertinent group company involved is situated in another member state of the EU. And the question to be asked in this case, as suggested by the ARB, is if a corresponding taxation would have ocurred if the dominating owner (Candice Ltd.) of the partnership would have been a Swedish company instead of a Cyprus company.

From this standpoint, which I believe is the main aspect of the reasoning of the ARB, the board underlines that the comparison of the two situations must take into account both the the sale by Salénhuset AB of the real property to the partnership and the subsequent sale by Candice Ltd. of its shares in the partnership to an outside buyer. With this in mind the deferral of tax allowed under the rules of the Swedish sub market price rules is recaptured if Candice Ltd. had been a Swedish company. So the refusal under the GAAR of applying the submarket price rules does not give rise to any detrimental tax treatment of the tax payer(s).

But Mr Westberg's approach focuses only on the first transaction, i.e. the sale of the real property by Salénhuset AB to the partnership. And then of course, by disallowing the application of the submarket pricing rules on the sale of the real property to the partnership, it is fair to say that a negative tax treatment will arise in the case where Candice Ltd. is a Cyprus company as our intra group sub market sale rules only would apply if Candice Ltd. had been a Swedish company.

So the ARB on the one hand and Mr Westberg on the other hand have adpoted different approaches for determining whether or not EU law has been violated. The ARB looks at both the sale by Salénhuset AB of the real property to the partnership and the sale by Candice Ltd. of the shares in the partnership, whereas Mr Westberg has limited his comparison of the different tax results arising from only the first transaction, the sale of the real property. He finds, without further explanation, that the question whether or not Cyprus taxes the subsequent gains on the sale of the shares and the consequences thereof is irrelevant.

This, however, is not a matter of fact but a matter of opinion and it would have been more interesting if Mr Westberg had put forward his arguments for rejecting the ARB's standpoint instead of just dismissing them as irrelevant.

In my view, and considering that the tax planning strategy involves two transactions by two companies in the same group, it seems appropriate that the EU question of detrimental treatment should be determined with regard to the final tax resulting from the combined procedure. The attitude taken by Mr Westberg to single out just one of the links of the chain of transactions where every such link must hold to achieve a successful outcome of the tax avoidance strategy is too simplistic.

And this brings me to a further important aspect of the strategy adopted by Salénhuset AB which I have already touched upon above and which I also brought up in my earlier article: The tax planning does not consist only of the two steps discussed but also of the repatriation of the gains derived by Candice Ltd. upon its sale of its shares in the partnership. What is supposed to happen to this money? I believe one can take it for granted that the plan has been to eventually repatriate it to Sweden. What other purpose could a Swedish real property holding company have of a lot of funds winding up in a Cyprus letter-box subsidiary?

This repatriation can be done either by Salénhuset AB selling its shares in Candice Ltd. with its (only) cash asset to an outside buyer or by bringing home a dividend from Candice Ltd. A sale of Candice Ltd. is tax free under Swedish tax law. A dividend payment between common market companies is governed by the EU parent/subsidiary directive exempting the dividend from source withholding taxes (in Cyprus in this case) and from income tax in the country of the recipient (Sweden). The reason and the underlying purpose of these rules is of course to encourage cross-border investments within the Community and, on a reciprocal basis, to allow the profits arising from such foreign investments to flow tax free back to the investor. But in this case the profits have arisen not in Cyprus but in Sweden from the appreciation of Salénhusets AB's real property situated in Sweden. Candice Ltd. is a company which has contributed nothing to the business of the Salénhuset AB group. (It has in fact only given rise to expenses for company formation, management etc.) Can it be conceived that the authors of the parent/subsidiary directive had in mind that such a step by step profit shifting of income arising in Sweden and transported to and from Cyprus should also benefit from the common market reliefs? I would strongly suggest that the answer is no. A reason supporting this argument is that the directive contains a special abuse clause disallowing the reliefs thereof in such cases. And I firmly consider that the whole tax strategy adopted by Salénhuset AB is a blatant example of such abuse. With all this in mind, i.e, also the repatriation of the gain back to Sweden, maybe the SAC would have been prompted to submit the case to the ECJ for a ruling on EU law!

It is unfortunate that Salénhuset AB in its advance ruling application has not opened up for the ARB and the SAC for a discussion also of the repatriation of the profits from Cyprus to Sweden so that the whole tax strategy is laid bare. Alternatively one could say that it was a mistake by the courts not to oblige Salénhuset AB to include this transaction for examination.

A couple of years ago I wrote a long article about our Swedish tax avoidance measures and their relation to EU law focussing mainly on CFC matters (”Swedish CFC Taxation and the Business Purpose Concept”) specifically the point whether Sweden could enforce its CFC rules regarding controlled companies established in the EU. This article has been published in Tax Notes International, Volume 50, Number 2, April 14, 2008.

The article discusses mainly the ruling by the ECJ in the Cadbury Schweppes case ((C196/04), Doc 2006-19082 or 2006 WTD 177-8) where the ECJ gave further evidence of earlier opinions denying common market reliefs for ”wholly artificial arrangements” designed to avoid national taxation in the membership countries. The Court emphasized that an actual business must be performed by the controlled company in its host country for an indefinite period of time. It eloquently described this as an ”endeavor to assist in the economic and social interpenetration within the Community by means of establishing a subsisiary in the host member state”. Controlled companies that were mere ”letterbox companies”, the Court continued, should thus not qualify for common market freedoms. It would be absurd to suggest that Candice Ltd. has endeavored to assist in the economic and social interpenetration of Cyprus.

In my Tax Notes International article I made reference to Stig von Bahr, a former judge of both the SAC and the ECJ, who had also written a paper regarding tax avoidance and community law and the Cadbury Schweppes case, which was published in Skattenytt 11/2007 pp. 644-651, where he demonstrated that the ECJ maintains a strong aversion to the acceptance of artificial arrangements. He further concludes regarding non-harmonized legislation such as direct tax legislation that if a transaction or arrangement within the Community constitutes ”pratique abusive or abus de droit” under Community law, the liberties provided under the EC Treaty are not available. Thus, only if the tax payer can convincingly demonstrate that he has sound business or other non-tax motivations for his behaviour and that there is no ”abus de droit” the member state cannot enforce its domestic anti-avoidance legislation or other similar measures.

In its ruling in Salénhuset AB the SAC has concluded that the company´s behaviour is charachterized by ”artificial arrangements (konstlade förhållanden) that clearly have had nothing to do with the organisation of its business operations”. A wording which embraces that of the ECJ in Cadbury Schweppes.

In my opinion, there is a big difference between situations where the application of a membership state´s domestic anti-avoidance measures is invoked compared to a situation where a straight reading or interpretation of a member state law may be considered to interfere with EU law. In the first case we are dealing with a behaviour where the tax payer is adopting artificial arrangements completely disconnected from any ”endeavors to to assist in the economic or social interpenetration of the community,” and deliberately is attempting to benefit from inconsistencies or loopholes in the legislation whereas this, of course, is not otherwise the case. Therefor, if the ECJ finds that tax avoidance has occurred under domestic rules in a member state it will ”follows suit” and not ”give salvation” for the tax avoidance.

In other words one could suggest that a tax avoider is not entitled to the same level of equal rights under EU law. Ulrika Rosander, also a scholar of the Jönköping International Business School, in her (quite brilliant) doctoral thesis on the GAAR (Generalklausul mot skatteflykt, JIBS Dissertation Series No. 040) boldly suggests that taxpayers engaging in transactions that lack economic substance should not be entitled to the same degree of legal security.

Consequently, I believe that the EU judges, considering Salénhust AB's tax bill on only 0.1 percent of its profits also after repatriation thereof to Sweden,would have been impervious to any claims from the company that it had suffered from ”negativ särbehandling”. They would sit with their hands folded.

International tax planning strategies in Sweden very often make use of companies set up in various countries with favourable tax rules and/or apply treaty shopping maneuvers designed to avoid taxation completely. And invariably these companies lack completely any economic substance. They are mere letterbox companies existing only as paper constructions in the drawers of the investors' legal counsels. These companies usually are artificial arrangements giving no assistance to the economic or social interpenetration of their host countries.

I applaud the ARB's approach to the EU law problem discussed in this article and I welcome the fact that both the ARB and the SAC have found that their are limits to BEPS.

Stockholm November 2013


1 In accordance with anglosaxon court practise and also that of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) , (and above all in order to avoid confusion with future cases where Cyprus may be involved), I prefer to identify the ruling not as the Cyprus case but by the name of the tax payer, the Swedish company Salénhuset AB.

 

måndag 4 november 2013

IKEA's and Ingvar Kamprad's tax problems.


WebJournal on International Taxation in Sweden, WITS, no 3/2013.

IKEA's and Ingvar Kamprad's tax problems.

For an international tax analyst like myself Ingvar Kamprad and his IKEA business empire never cease to be of interest. In the recent past I have posted no less than four WITS reports on this blog regarding tax matters concerning Kamprad/IKEA (5 March, 17 September, 26 September and 16 November 2012). My main suggestion on these blogs is that IKEA Systems B.V., the Dutch company that collects all the 3-percent royalties, some 7-8 billion SEK every year, from IKEA stores around the world for the use of the IKEA trademark, should pay tax hereon in the countries where these stores are situated.

In a book ”IKEA på väg mot framtiden” (IKEA heading for the future) which has been published just recently this conclusion is further reinforced. But that is not all. The book also gives rise to serious considerations regarding Mr Kamprad's personal tax situation, now that, as reported, he is moving back to Sweden from Switzerland where he has resided for many years.

The book has three contributing authors: Stellan Björk, an experienced business reporter for Veckans Affärer and Lennart Dahlgren, a close aide of Ingvar Kamprad for more than thirty years both of whom have authored earlier books about IKEA and also, as special researcher, Carl von Schulzenheim who has analyzed many large companies for the past fifteen years and before that was active in financial and accounting matters in a number of companies. Further references to the book will be tagged ”Björck/Dahlgren”.

The taxation of IKEA's royalties

The main reason for my opinion that IKEA Systems B.V. in The Netherlands should pay source tax on the trademark royalties it derives from around the world is that the company is not the owner of the trademarks. Or, more correctly, was not the owner thereof until 1 January 2012. Instead the Liechtenstein foundation Interogo,which was set up by Mr Ingvar Kamprad in 1989, has been the owner of the IKEA trademark until the end of 2011 when Interogo, which was widely announced in the medias, sold the trademark to Inter IKEA Systems in The Netherlands for the mindboggling amount of 75 billion SEK .
 
Interogo was completely unknown to the rest of the world until the beginning of 2011. Then its existence was revealed by a probe conducted by a Swedish television programme team ”Uppdrag Granskning” (Mission Investigation) and Smålandsposten which discovered that Interogo was the real owner of IKEA Systems B.V and also that the capital held by Interogo was about – are you ready - 100 billion SEK (about 15 billion USD), a large part of which apparently is made up of the royalties passed on to Interogo from Inter IKEA Systems. The Interogo funds after the sale of the trademark, about 175 billion, thus add up to more than four times the Swedish defence budget, bank-rolling – it appears – much of the IKEA empire.

Björck/Dahlgren also conclude that the IKEA trademark has been owned not by Inter IKEA Systems but by Interogo which, as mentioned in my aforementioned blogs, has indeed also been admitted by IKEA itself. I refer to the statement reported in Dagens Industri in the beginning of December 2011 by Mr Hans Gydell, CEO of Inter IKEA Holding and also a member of the Supervisory Board of Interogo: ”The ownership of the IKEA trademark has been placed for all eternity in the tax paradise Liechtenstein, and even if Mr Kamprad would so wish it would be impossible to break this up and transfer ownership elsewhere. It was precisly for the purpose of protecting the IKEA concept and trademark for the future that this very special and stable ownership arrangement was chosen and I have never heard him regret this decision.”

And just three weeks later on 1 january 2012 the trademark nevertheless was transferred to Inter IKEA Systems!!

Also, as reported by Mr Anders Bylund, Head of Group Communications Inter IKEA Group, (see again my aforementioned blogs), Inter IKEA Systems, before January 2012, had a separate license agreement with Interogo obliging Inter IKEA Systems to pay a compensation for the right to utilise the IKEA trademarks in its global franchise operations.

As I have carefully explained in my earlier blogs, and which I will therefore omit repeating here, Inter IKEA Systems for tax purposes cannot be considered to have been the beneficial owner of the royalty payments received from around the world. And under most tax treaties source tax on royalties is waived only for payments to such a beneficial owner. Because of the licence agreement between Inter IKEA Systems and Interogo, where Inter IKEA over the years has passed on the 100 billion SEK to Interogo, the legal owner of the trademarks, Inter IKEA Systems has not had ”the full right to use and enjoy the income received unconstrained by any contractual or legal obligation to pass the payment received to another person.” This last mentioned quote is the language used by OECD's Committe on Fiscal Affairs when determining the meaning of ”beneficial ownership” in its Model Tax Treaty.

Somewhat surprisingly, Björck/Dahlgren maintain that the trademark in the past was owned by Kamprad personally. ”At the time” (page 38) ”a dispute arose with the Swedish tax authorities who claimed that the trademark had been sold by IKEA to Kamprad and that this money was taxable income for the company. But Kamprad had insisted that the rights had never been sold to him. He owned them personally. Period. Kamprad had enlisted the well-known tax professor Göran Grosskopf in this complicated affair which finally petered out and never went to court”...”What subsequently happened to the trademark rights is unclear other than that when the information about the existence of the Interogo foundation surfaced in 2011 the trademark at that time was owned by this foundation.”

This”, continues Björck/Dahlgren, ”has given rise to a number of questions: When was the trademark transferred to Interogo? Did Kamprad donate the trademark to Interogo or did he sell it? Were there any other owners in between?” They have put these questions to IKEA/Kamprad who have responded that such questions relate to business transactions of a non-public character upon which we cannot comment.

The choice of The Netherlands as the base for Inter IKEA Systems B.V. is not haphazard. The Netherlands is renowned as a major player in international taxation. It has been reported that the amount of money passed through foreign-held holding companies in The Netherlands amounts to some thirty to forty times the gross national product of the country!

The Netherlands also has one of the most extensive tax treaty networks in the world usually exempting royalties alltogether from taxation in the source state. In The Netherlands this income, when it accrues to a company which is part of an international group, is taxed under very beneficial terms normally upon a negotiation/advance ruling with the tax authorities. The results of such rulings, by request of these authorities (!), remain confidential. The part of the royalty income which is passed on to the ultimate licensor in a third state is deductible for the payor and tax free in The Netherlands for the foreign recipient, also those that reside in pure tax havens. Björck/Dahlgren also report that the books of Inter IKEA Systems are not open to scrutiny due to some special exemption in Dutch company law.

In May 2006 i.e. three years before the discovery of Interogo, The Economist ran an article about IKEA titled ”IKEA: Flat-pack accounting” concluding that Inter IKEA ultimately was owned by a Netherlands Antilles company, run by a trust company in Curacao and that the beneficial owners remain hidden from view – IKEA refuses to identify them – but that they almost certainly are the members of the Kamprad family. With regard to taxation The Economist declared that clearly the Kamprad family pays the same meticulous attention to tax avoidance as IKEA does to low prices in its stores and further reports that out of earnings of several hundred million dollars which undoubtedly come from the collection of franchise fees, IKEA paid 3.5 percent in taxes. In 2007, The ”Berne Declaration”, a non-profit, non-governmental Swiss organisation that promotes corporate responsibility, formally criticizising IKEA for its tax avoidance strategies, gave Kamprad its ”Public Eye” award for corporate irresponsibility which was announced at that year's World Economic Forum in Davos. (http://www.evb.ch/cm_data/Ikea_e.pdf.)

As mentioned, Interogo's existence and its relations to the rest of the IKEA structure were completely unknown until the discovery that was made by Uppdrag Granskning and Smålandsposten in the beginning of 2011. Not even Mr Anders Dahlvig, CEO of the IKEA Group between 1999 and 2009 had any knowledge of Interogo (Björck/Dahlgren page 13).

And this lack of knowledge is probably the reason why the beneficial ownership question has never been raised by the tax authorities concerned in this matter. They simply didn't know that the royalties received were passed on to Interogo.

Björck/Dahlgren maintain that ”Kamprad on many occasions has declared that he ”gave away” IKEA to a Dutch foundation. But he has never said anything about the trademarks. Obviously they were not included when he gave IKEA to the Dutch foundation. In other words, he has told only half the truth. Probably we are dealing with a number of property rights. Apparently Kamprad has owned a small part thereof entitling him to a share of the royalties, a right which has subsequently been transferred to the sons."

The main thing is, however,” continue Björck/Dahlgren, that a franchising system was set up. But the royalty company Inter IKEA Systems B.V. did not own the trademarks. This was solved by drawing up a license agreement between this company and Interogo under which Inter IKEA Systems paid licence fees to Interogo thus enabling Inter IKEA to franchise the trademark to all IKEA stores worldwide. The whole setup is quite ”insidious” (lurig) declare Björck/Dahlgren. ”On the price tags of all IKEA products one reads Copyright Inter Ikea Systems B.V. which undoubtedly gives the impression that the company owns the trademark. In fact, however, the company has ”hired” it from the owner the Interogo Foundation. The licence fees have been deductible in the Netherlands company. And certainly taxed very moderately in Liechtenstein.When the existence of the Interogo foundation was disclosed it appeared that the foundation had capital reserves of almost 100 billion SEK including the holding of the Inter IKEA group. Today this figure has probably risen to 160 billion due to the sale of the the trademark for a sum of 75 billion SEK. This sale by Interogo of the IKEA trademark(s) to Inter IKEA took place on 1 January 2012 maybe to get out of the much critisized Liechtenstein affair”.

The most contentious allegation by Björck/Dahlgren is that Ingvar Kamprad has been involved in a bitter controversy with his three sons Peter, Jonas and Mathias regarding the Interogo billions, suggesting that Kamprad, when he set up a number of his ingenious Dutch foundations back in the eighties, something that was widely announced at the time, has ”forgotten” to mention anything about Interogo and the fact that he had retained personal ownership of the IKEA trademark. And he has also failed to disclose that he had preserved the right to a portion of the royalty income derived from the payments flowing into Interogo. Over the years this albeit tiny percentage has of course grown into several billion SEK which, according to Björck/Dahlgren, thus constitutes ”a nice little ”deal” for Ingvar Kamprad Elmtaryd Agunnartorp”. The conflict with his sons had focussed on the rights to the Interogo funds. The Kamprad sons insisted that they had the legal rights hereto and after enlisting prominent American legal expertise which supported their position the old Kamprad, but only after serious bargaining, finally threw in the towel.

In an angry letter, signed also by his sons and printed in the recent issue of the IKEA News Magazine, Kamprad has vigourously denied the existence of any family controversy involving American ”star lawyers”. The letter, however, provided no comment to the allegation that money had been been passed through Interogo to the Kamprad family members personally.

All this has given rise to exited comments in the Swedish medias. Kamprad's longtime personal friend, and former editor of Dagens Industri and Svenska Dagbladet, Bertil Torekull, referring to private conversations from the Kamprad fishing cottage in Bölsö back in the late nineties, confirmed (in Dagens Industri 20 September 2013) that he had indeed been informed about the royalties picked up by Kamprad from his IKEA trademark. Torekull, however, found this no more remarkable than that Björn Borg had sold out his name and that Astrid Lindgren's children now held the property rights to her name. He also declared that the ”coppers” (slantar) so earned by Kamprad, the amount of which he estimated had risen to maybe 500 billion SEK , would in any case wind up with the sons upon Kamprad's death. (But I am sure he must have meant millions.)

Already in 1997 Torekull wrote a book, sanctioned by Kamprad and titled ”The IKEA Story” (Historien om IKEA) based on numerous and candid interviews with Kamprad and his close aids. He was also given free acess to all IKEA files. But there was not a word about Interogo in the book. Torekull, in 2011, has published a new edition of the book. In its foreword he reproaches Kamprad for not having told the whole truth about the details of the ownership relations of IKEA, its financial muscles nor its real steering instruments. He further declares that the close economic and ideological connection between owner and business activities, where the ultimate control of the enterprise continues to be in the hands of Kamprad, is symbolized by the 3 percent royalties of all IKEA's sales that goes to the family as owner of the concept. On page 146 he mentions that ”these amounts are deposited in various (probably the founder does not himself know how many) foundations, one of them beeing Interogo. But Interogo is just one of many deposits (placeringsinstanser)”. Torekull further concludes that Inter IKEA Systems is just ”a caretaker of the trademark (märkesvårdare) functioning a bit like The Vatican for Catholicism: It carefully oversees that the prescribed smalandish (småländsk) faith is exercised in all IKEA temple-stores, sometimes, one will find, down to the level of the last rosary...”

Mr Kamprad's personal tax situation in Sweden.

Someone has said that the use of foreign trusts and foundations is unknown to half the world and indispensable to the other half. Mr Kamprad no doubt belongs to that second half. The new book reports how Kamprad has set up not only Interogo but a number of other foundations in various jurisdictions. The main reason herefor, allegedly, is to preserve IKEA for the future. On Interogo's website the purpose of ”securing the independence and longevity of IKEA” is mentioned no less than three times over half a page. But there is no doubt that tax aspects have been a driving force too. The reason for setting up Interogo in Liechtenstein is surely also to protect it from outside observation. Indeed, paragraph 12 of the statutes of Interogo declares: ”These statutes including specific changes thereof and all other factual and legal circumstances affecting the Foundation may not be disclosed to outsiders, in particular not to foreign administrative bodies.”

It can be safely suggested that in Sweden the taxation of foreign trusts and foundations is unknown to much more than half the Swedish population. There are no specific rules hereon in Swedish tax law and case law is very sparse. There are a couple of articles written on the subject. I myself, in 1996, wrote a thirty page report on these matters for the Information Bulletin of The Institute of Foreign Law, (IUR-INFORMATION 24/97, Beskattning av utländska privata truster och familjestiftelser). In that same bulletin in 1998, no 21/98, and in 1999, no 9/99, I published another 17 pages on theses issues. (They are all in Swedish).

Due to the alien legal charachter of foreign foundations and especially of anglo-saxon trusts and the poor regulatory supervision of these foundations and trusts in many jurisdictions, the Supreme Administrative Court in Sweden, especially in such cases where the taxation of these problems has been brought up in applications for advance rulings, has been very reluctant to give any answers and simply dismissed them.

A basic problem to be confronted for tax purposes is whether the foreign trust/foundation should be recognised as a separate tax entity. The main requirement is to establish that the assets transferred to the trust/foundation have been properly and sufficently separated from (avskiljda från) the settlor. And special safeguards must have been taken to prevent the settlor or his nearest of kin from continued posession and control of the funds of the trust/foundation. And these safeguards must be absolute and irrevocable. No ”letters of wishes” or other instructions to protectors and trustees etc. at the time of the settlement or later may be issued allowing the settlor in any way to claw back or gain control of the assets of a foreign trust/foundation.

The separation of powers also requires that the settlor be excluded from the management and supervision of the trust/foundation. The constitutional council (Stiftungsrat) of Interogo consists of two Liechtenstein lawyers (partners of Marxer & Partner Vaduz, Liechtenstein). They, however, belong to the so called ”pin-stripe mafia” and only take care of the paper work of Interogo. The real nerve centre is the special Supervisory Board of Interogo which is chaired by Ingvar Kamprad. He, and after him the Kamprad family members, one of which is already a board member, can veto any appointment to the board. (In the past the activities of the Supervisory Board were conducted within a separate foundation set up in Canada!)

If the ”separation” of the settlor from the trust/foundation is not carried out appropriately the settlement of the trust/foundation for Swedish tax purposes will be ignored as if the trust/foundation did not exist. In such case, the settlor will continue to be regarded as the owner of the trust's/foundation's assets. And thus personally liable to taxation for the income from the assets thereof. If the settlor is resident in Sweden he will be subject to world-wide tax liability on the proceeds from these assets. If the settlor is not resident in Sweden he will be liable to tax on such income that is sourced in Sweden. Such as income from Swedish permanent establishments, dividends from Swedish companies and royalties from Swedish licencees/franchisees.

Moreover, Björck/Dahlgren have extensively discussed whether the statutes of a foundation can be changed (page 31-33 and 169-170). Mr Per Heggenes, Kamprad's personal spokesman, insists that, according to the present wording of the statutes, the Kamprad family has no access to the capital of any of the foundations. Legal (American) expertise, discussing Kamprad's net wealth, disagree of whether the statutes can be changed thus allowing the capital to be available to Kamprad. Björck/Dahlgren have noted that when Jan Stenbäck died in 2002 the main part of his fortune was locked into a Liechtenstein trust but since then the shares -”eureka” (simsalabim) - have been divided into personal holdings by his heirs. Also the Tetra Pak foundations in Liechtenstein were dissolved when Gad Rausing's three heirs became owners of the packaging giant when buying out their uncle Hans Rausing. Björck/Dahlsten thus conclude that, albeit difficult, it should be possible to change the statutes of foundations in Liechtenstein. Interesting to observe too in this context is that there seems to have been no problems for Interogo to transfer its most valuable asset, the IKEA trademark, to Inter IKEA Systems in The Netherlands despite Mr. Gydell´s firm declaration to the contrary as mentioned above. And transferring the trademarks elsewhere from Inter IKEA Systems in a subsequent transaction, for instance back to the Kamprad family members, should pose no special legal problems. Mr Heggenes' reference to the ”present” wording of the statutes of Interogo also gives rise to concern. Most disturbing, however, when considering the tax status of Interogo are the allegations that the Kamprad family should have ”rights” to and may withdraw funds therefrom. It invites the suggestion that Interogo serves as the Kamprad family's private money-box. (And Mr Torekull's idea that these funds would wind up with the Kamprad sons upon their father's death suggesting that Interogo could be inherited by the sons represents, with all respect, a grave misunderstanding of the basic legal character of foundations.)

Conclusion

In my opinion IKEA under its royalty/franchise structure has been operating under tax conditions which to a large extent provide unwarranted competitive advantages. This calls for an examination of the beneficial ownership issue. Today a tax information exchange agreement (TIEA) has been concluded by Sweden with Liechtenstein – and there is also one with The Netherlands - which will now allow the tax authorities to investigate these matters. Mr Kamprad's objection that these matters relate to business transactions of a non-public character upon which he cannot comment can be ignored.

The fiscal consequences of such an investgation are enormous. I would suggest that the tax to be collected in Sweden alone would be enough to finance a couple of hospitals or several miles of super highways in our country. Maybe, however, the Swedish tax administration will shy away from litigating a case of such a magnitude and which would attract such worldwide publicity. On the other hand the beneficial ownership issue is something that should be of concern to all countries that have an IKEA store and a tax treaty with The Netherlands.

Moreover, considering the circumstances and contradictions that have recently become known regarding Ingvar Kamprad's links to Interogo and the conditions under which Interogo is managed and controlled, the tax consequences hereof in Sweden have become critical. It can be assumed that the Swedish tax authorities will take a serious look at these matters when Kamprad returns home to Sweden.

Also of interest to those tax jurisdictions concerned is to determine if/when and to what extent payments have been actually made by Interogo to the Kamprad family members in the past (possibly through various other deposits (placeringsinstanser). In Sweden all payments made to resident beneficiaries of foreign trusts/foundations are taxed as employment income subject to full municipal and federal progressive tax rates. Björck/Dahlgren (page 39) believe that the sums involved may run into several billion.

We live in a globalized world, many of us in democratic societies and under deregulated economies. This calls for corresponding transparency, rectitude and honesty in financial and tax matters. In this context, and considering again Mr Torekull's reference to the Vatican, one may report that its national bank IOR (Istituto per le Opere di Religione) has recently launched a website and embarked on ”a process of comprehensive reform, to foster the most rigorous professional compliance standards”. For his final legacy Mr Kamprad should do the same.

Stockholm, November 2013.
Peter Sundgren
peter.sundgren@gmail.com




söndag 10 mars 2013

Tioårsregelns historik (och lägesrapport).


WebJournal on International Taxation in Sweden, WITS, no 1/2013

Den s.k. tioårsregeln i 3 kap. 19 § inkomstskattelagen, den regel som innebär att Sverige vad gäller fysiska personer upprätthåller ett skatteanspråk på kapitalvinster på aktier (och vissa andra liknande värdepapper) under tio år efter det att aktieägaren/säljaren flyttar utomlands är säkert en av de regler som tilldragit sig mest intresse när det gäller internationell skatteplanering. Anledningen härtill är att regeln låter sig ganska lätt kringgås och att detta regelmässigt medför mycket stora skattefördelar för den aktuella aktieägaren. Eftersom dessa skatteflyktsupplägg så gott som alltid kräver experthjälp utgör den också en guldgruva för internationella skatterådgivare som också ivrigt marknadsför detsamma. Man använder sig av uttrycket att göra en (fördelaktig) ”exit” vid företagsförsäljning och utlandsflyttning. Se t.ex. www.sparsamskatt.se.

Tioårsegeln infördes 1984 av en socialdemokratisk regering men skatteanspråket har upprätthållits av alla följande regeringar oavsett politisk färg. Det finns alltså en obruten ambition hos lagstiftaren om att den värdestegring som sker av ett svenskt företag skall beskattas här i Sverige även om aktieägaren flyttar till utlandet Sverige.

Det finns veterligen ingen statistik över i vilken omfattning regeln inbringat någon skatt men den är sannolikt mycket liten.

Här följer en översiktlig historik som utvisar hur man lyckats tillvarata tioårsregelns skatteanspråk under de 29 år som regeln funnits. Samtidigt redovisas vad som står för dörren i denna fråga.

Före 1984 var det fritt fram för en aktieägare att flytta utomlands och därefter sälja svenska aktier/värdepapper (och annan lös egendom) utan skattekonsekvenser i Sverige. Om aktierna emellertid utgjorde ett betydande innehav som gav aktieägaren ett inflytande i bolaget – i praktiken gällde detta framför allt innehav i fåmansbolag – hade dock detta den konsekvensen att vederbörande ansågs ha väsentlig anknytning till Sverige och således en kvarvarande skatterättslig bosättning i Sverige även efter utflyttningen och därmed en bestående full skattskyldighet i Sverige. Detta kunde dock enkelt undgås med utnyttjande av vad som populärt kallades ”första kronans princip”. Strategin var att teckna kontrakt om aktieavyttringen innan utflyttningen och att ta betalning först därefter. På detta sätt förflyttades tidpunkten för skattskyldighetens inträde till detta senare tillfälle då någon skattskyldighet ej förelåg och då hade också den väsentliga anknytningen upphört eftersom den juridiskt bindande avyttringen av aktierna ägt rum innan utflyttningen. Ofta innebar denna timing av transaktionerna att någon skattskyldighet ej heller uppkom i det nya bosättningslandet eftersom avyttringen skett innan bosättningen påbörjats i detta land. Ibland förekommer också skattefrihet i inflyttningslandet av det skälet att försäljning avser utländska aktier.

Om aktieägaren flyttar till ett skatteavtalsland, varvid beskattningen blir beroende av vederbörandes hemvist enligt avtalet utgör den väsentliga anknytningen (enligt svensk rätt) som regel inte något problem om man omsorgsfullt vidtar åtgärder som etablerar den utflyttandes hemvist enligt skatteavtalet i det nya utflyttningslandet. Detta kräver emellertid regelmässigt att vederbörande avyttrar sin bostad/bostäder i Sverige så att han (enligt avtalet) inte har kvar i Sverige någon ”bostad som stadigvarande står till hans förfogande” i Sverige samt att han givetvis skaffar sig en sådan bostad i det nya landet. Detta är en helt avgörande förutsättning för att etablera hemvist i en avtalsstat. På detta sätt kan Sverige claima primär beskattningsrätt på aktieavyttringar endast om avtalet har en specifik regel som tillåter att Sverige som icke hemviststat får beskatta dessa vinster.

I så gott som alla avtal som Sverige träffat med andra stater fram till 1984 föreskrevs emellertid att det var hemviststaten som hade den exklusiva beskattningsrätten till aktievinster. Genom att alltså skaffa sig hemvist i den andra avtalsstaten undgick man således att beskattas i Sverige för aktievinster även efter tioårsregelns införande.

För den utflyttande gäller ju dock också att i möjligaste mån undvika att behöva betala skatt även i den aktuella inflyttningsstaten. Men detta blir naturligtvis beroende på de interna reglerna om aktievinstbeskattning i ifrågakommande land. Regelmässigt är sådana vinster lägre beskattade än i Sverige. I en del länder finnsd ingen vinstbeskattning alls i vart fall vad gäller utländska aktier. Andra länder, exempelvis Canada och Österrike har särskilda s.k. step-upregler som innebär att aktiernas ingångs-/anskaffningsvärde räknas upp till det marknadsvärde de har vid det tillfälle aktieägaren flyttar in i landet. Man får alltså vid detta tillfälle genomföra en beräkning av aktiernas marknadsvärde. På detta sätt uppkommer ingen vinst om man avyttrar aktierna strax efter inflyttningen. Om man flyttar till ett land med ett anglosachsiskt rättssystem som regelmässigt har regler som innebär att skattskyldighet för en utländsk inkomst inte inträffar innan den faktiskt remitteras till och faktiskt ianspråktas i landet ifråga kan även detta utnyttjas för att undvika eller skjuta upp beskattningen i detta land. På detta sätt uppkommer alltså dubbel skattefrihet i många fall. Inte så sällan flyttar vederbörande till ett land med särskilt förmånlig aktievinstbeskattning och som har ett lämpligt skatteavtal med Sverige bara under den tid då skattskyldigheten utlöses för att senare flytta till det land där han bestämt sig för att bo permanent. Det förekommer också att vederbörande efter det att kapitalvinsten realiserats skattemässigt utomlands återflyttar till Sverige. Dessa senast nämnda manövrer kan dock underkännas som skenutflyttningar med de är mycket svåra för skattemyndigheterna att bevisa i skattedomstol.

Eftersom tioårsregeln således trumfades över av våra skatteavtal blev det nödvändigt att börja omförhandla dessa på så sätt att Sverige som icke hemviststat tillerkändes primär beskattningsrätt på aktievinster, ett arbete som dock naturligtvis varit mycket tidsödande. Skatteflykten kunde därför i stort sett pågå utan problem i många år. I ett fall hamnade dock frågan på rubrikplats i massmedierna. Detta skedde sedan skatteverket runt 2005 upprepat slagit larm om de enorma aktievinster – det var fråga om flera miljarder - som försvann till Österrike och det visade sig att våra skatteavtalsförhandlare rullat tummarna i drygt ett decennium utan att få till ett nytt skatteavtal och där alla aktieägare utnyttjade den ovan nämnda step-upregeln som medförde dubbel skattefrihet. På grund av mediedrevet fick dock regeringen ändan ur vagnen med rekordfart och kompletterade skatteavtalet.

I takt med att avtalsarbetet fortskridit och på pappret gjort tioårsregeln tillämplig visavi avtalsländer har skatteplaneringen i ökad omfattning kommit att fokuseras på att i stället utnyttja utländska holdingbolagkonstruktioner för att kringgå regeln. Men det fanns två mycket effektiva hinder häremot. Dels fick en privatperson under den tidigare gällande valutaregleringen aldrig bilda utländska bolag dels fanns strikta skatteregler mot internöverlåtelser av bolag i vår svenska interna skatterätt.

Men till alla skatteplanerares förtjusning försvann dessa restriktioner hux flux, valutaregleringen 1989 och beskattningsreglerna om interna latenta aktievinster när skattereformen infördes 1991. Detta öppnade således för överlåtelser av svenska aktier till anskaffningsvärde till utländska holdingbolag vilka därefter, sedan hemvist etablerats i en avtalsstat, kunde avyttras utan att träffas av tioårsregeln, vilken ju, som ovan nämnts endast avsåg försäljningar av svenska bolag. Och detta tillstånd tilläts överraskande nog fortsätta ända till 1999 alltså i nästan ett helt decennium. Då infördes regler innebärande att underprissatta interna överlåtelser till utländska bolag skulle anses ha skett till marknadsvärde dvs en beskattning av förtäckt reavinst.

Som bekant hade Sverige vid denna tidpunkt blivit medlem i EU vilket medförde att frågan väcktes om dessa sistnämnda underprissättningsregler ansågs stå i strid med unionens principer om fri etablering. Och det ansåg domstolen i Luxemburg att de gjorde. Till den del en underprisöverlåtelse av ett svenskt bolag sker till ett holdingbolag inom EU fick således den nya lagen om interna underprisöverlåtelser ingen effekt. Detta framkom i det s.k. X och Y målet år 2002.

För att då råda bot mot denna möjlighet att kringå tioårsregeln framlade regeringen 2007, dvs efter fem (5) år, ett förslag som innebar att tioårsregeln även skulle omfatta avyttring av utländska aktier. Om man avyttrade det aktuella utländska holdingbolaget inom tio år efter utflyttningen skulle alltså även denna avyttring fångas upp av tioårsregeln. Av flera remissinstanser (samt även i en särskild skrivelse av mig) framhölls emellertid att en sådan åtgärd var totalt meningslös eftersom många skatteavtal endast tillät primär beskattning i Sverige av avyttring av svenska aktier. Dessa avtal förhindrade således en beskattning av aktievinsten i Sverige av det utländska holdingbolaget. Införandet av regeln som likväl skedde avslöjar skattelagstiftarens oskuld inför hur internationell skatteplanering går till. I propositionen till lagstiftningen erkände dock (den förmodat rodnande) lagstiftaren att lagstiftningen var enkel att kringgå och framhöll behovet av att frågan ytterligare behövde utredas. Detta var alltså på vårkanten 2007 dvs för nu nästan sex (6) år sedan.

Sedan utvecklar sig en rad mycket besynnerliga omständigheter i frågan. I juni 2007 tillfrågade jag finansdepartementet som bekräftade att en utredning skulle påbörjas. På hösten 2008 dvs ca ett och ett halvt (1½) år senare vid en förnyad förfrågan uppgav departementet att någon utredning dock ännu inte påbörjats ”men att man kände till problematiken”. Vad som då inte framkommit och som hade undgått såväl uppgiftslämnarens som min uppmärksamhet var att frågan om en uppskovsbeskattning av aktievinstutflyttningar hade upptagits i direktiven (2008:80) den 5 juni 2008, dvs ca ett halvår dessförinnan, till den s.k. Skatteincitamentsutredningen. Denna utredning lämnade sina förslag i april 2009 (SOU 2009:33). Enligt utredningens förslag ansågs dock att någon lagstiftning mot aktievinstutflyttningarna inte borde införas! Under hösten 2009 skrev jag en mycket kritisk kommentar över utredningens arbete. Artikeln nekades publicering i Svensk Skattetidning men finns att läsa på www.skatter.se/artiklar under rubriken ”Försäljning av aktier efter utflyttning del 2”.

Under samma tid, närmare bestämt i november 2009 publicerade Riksrevisionen en rapport under rubriken Internationell skattekontroll (RiR 2009:24) med svidande kritik över att regering och riksdag tillåtit det aktuella ”skatteläckaget” att fortgå under så lång tid. I denna utredning nämns anmärkningsvärt nog inte heller något om Skatteincitamentsutredningens tidigare arbete, kanske pga att Riksrevisionen vid de utfrågningar den gjorde hos finansdepartementet inte upplystes härom.

Därefter förlöper ytterligare ett drygt år utan att något händer i ärendet. På våren 2011 tas dock Riksrevisionens kritik upp först som en skriftlig fråga i riksdagen (av riksdagsmannen Jacob Johnsson) och under sensommaren samma år i en interpellationsdebatt där Anders Borg i riksdagen nu erkände att han var medveten om problematiken men att frågan krävde ytterligare utredning (sic.) främst av de EU- och skatteavtalsrättsliga aspekterna ifråga. Han anförde också att han avsåg att noga (min understrykning) följa upp utredningsarbetet. Någon hänvisning till Skatteincitamentsutredningens nu närmare två år gamla utredning från 2009, som även berört EU- och skatteavtalsproblemen gjordes inte av finansministern!

Borgs påstående att frågan kompliceras av EU- och skatteavtalsrättsliga problem är dessutom helt felaktigt. Vad gäller just dessa frågor framgår nämligen av bl.a. Katia Cejies doktorsavhandling ”Utflyttningsbeskattning av kapitalökningar – en skattevetenskaplig studie i internationell personbeskattning med fokus på skatteavtals- och EU-rättsliga problem” som utkom 2010 att några avgörande hinder inte finns för att stoppa aktievinstutflyttningarna med stöd av en s.k exit- och uppskovsbeskattning för att komma tillrätta med problemen. Domstolen i Luxemburg har således i olika mål godkänt flera medlemsstaters interna lagstiftning om underprissättning och uppskov under förutsättning att förluster medges vid avyttring av holdingbolagsaktierna och att uppskovet inte förses med krav på att ställa säkerhet. Därutöver kan nämnas att EU-rådet i december 2008 i en särskild resolution http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ecofin/104449.pdf ”on coordinating exit taxation” har inbjudit medlemsstaterna att vidtaga åtgärder för att förhindra den skatteflykt som uppstår pga. att en inkomsttagare inom unionen upphör att vara skattskyldig i en medlemsstat och i stället blir skattskyldig i en annan medlemsstat. Som just påpekats har alltså flera medlemsstater i EU infört bestämmelser för att förhindra aktievinstutflyttningar de drabbats av. Det kan finnas vissa kontrolltekniska problem att ta ställning till vad gäller uppskoven men man kan utgå ifrån att en lagstiftning av berört slag har sådana preventiva effekter att antalet fall av aktievinstutflyttningar kommer att bli begränsat.

Det var alltså på våren 2011, dvs för två (2) år sedan, som Anders Borg stod i riksdagen och talade om skatteläckaget ifråga och käckt lovade att frågan skulle utredas. Jag har därefter vid flera tillfällen under 2012 och i år förhört mig hos finansdepartementet om vad som händer med denna utredning och varje gång bara fått det kortfattade beskedet att ”ärendet bereds”.

Men inte nog härmed. Nyligen har jag blivit varse att frågan om underprisöverlåtelser (även vad gäller beskattning av fysiska personer) har överlämnats till den sittande Företagsskattekommittén samt även att den ovan nämnda Skatteincitamentsutredningen från 2009 överlämnats till kommittén för kännedom. Kommitténs sekreterare (Anna Brink) har bekräftat att frågan utreds för närvarande och att besked skall lämnas i slutbetänkandet som skall avges till regeringen den 31 mars 2014.

Av det nämnda framgår alltså att frågan bereds såväl av finansdepartementet som av Företagsskattekommittén! Någon förklaring till detta dubbla utredningsarbete har (trots påstötningar) ej lämnats av finansdepartementet.

Allt sedan år 2002, dvs för elva (11) år sedan, då X- och Y-domen lades fram av luxemburgdomstolen, stod det alltså klart att tioårsregeln ånyo kunde lätt kringås. År 2007, fem (5) år senare, utvidgades regeln till att omfatta utländska bolag i syfte motverka den uppkomna kringgåendemöjligheten men detta var som ovan förklarats inget annat än ett (kraftfullt) slag i luften. Och i dag ytterligare sex (6) år senare fortsätter således skattebastappet i oförminskad styrka. Härom vittnar bl.a. den information som lämnades vid en mässa som nyligen hölls i Stockholm som särskilt avsåg att locka svenska pensionärer att flytta utomland och att köpa fastighet där. Förutom uppgifter om det gynnsamma affärsläget till följd av låga fastighetspriser i medelhavsländerna i den internationella finanskrisens spår, stark kronkurs och låga räntor framhölls särskilt vid vissa seminarier de fördelaktiga beskattningsförhållanden – särskilt poängterades X och Y domen - som gjorde det möjligt att, som man uttryckte det, ”trolla bort” 10-årsregeln.1 Strömmen av utlandsflyttare är f.n. särskilt stark pga. de stora fyrtiotalistkullarna som nu gått i pension.2

Och det är inga småbelopp som undgår beskattning i Sverige genom de aktuella aktievinstuppläggen. Skatteverket har i flera rapporter, se bl.a. Skattefelskarta för Sverige (Rapport 2008;1) slagit larm om att skattebastappen i dessa sammanhang uppgår till miljardbelopp varje år något som Riksrevisionen också bekräftat i sin nämnda rapport. (Enligt en obekräftad uppgift lär försäljningen för ett antal år sedan av Skype till E-bay, en affär i mångmiljardklassen, ha dragit nytta av Österrike-upplägget).

Sammanfattningsvis kan konstateras att lagstiftarens och skatteavtalsförhandlarnas arbete med att i praktiken tillvarataga det skatteanspråk som görs gällande i tioårsregeln under alla år har varit släpphänt, ineffektivt och förvirrat vilket har kostat den svenska statskassan oerhört mycket pengar (men skapat nöjda aktieägare och goda inkomster för den internationella skatterådgivarkretsen).

Och nästa år har det gått trettio (30) år sedan tioårsregeln infördes...

Stockholm i mars 2013.
Peter Sundgren

Fotnoter:
1I den under förra året av Högsta Förvaltningsdomstolen meddelade domen i det s.k. Cypernmålet har domstolen (och tidigare även Skatterättsnämnden) enhälligt förklarat att en underprisöverlåtelse var att anse som skatteflykt enligt skatteflyktslagen om etablerandet av det utländska holdingbolaget och underprisöverlåtelsen utgjorde ”ett konstlat förfarande som uppenbart saknar samband med organisationen av en näringsverksamhet och endast kommit till stånd för att undvika en beskattning som annars skulle ske vid avyttring av en tillgång i näringsverksamheten”. Det vore oansvarigt att rekommendera de aktuella aktievinstutflyttningarna utan hänsynstagande härtill. Mina kommentarer till domen  finns att läsa på min blogg www.petersundgren.blogspot.com under rubriken ”Glädjande utgång i Cypern-målet”.

2En stor del av informationen ägnades åt betydelsen av att inte ha väsentlig anknytning till Sverige efter utflyttningen. Man försummade dock att framhålla de inte så sällan uppkommande positiva effekterna av att bibehålla väsentlig anknytning vid utflyttning till avtalsländer som t.ex bibehållet avdrag för räntekostnader, rot-/rutavdrag, jobbskatteavdrag, allmänna avdrag och grundavdrag.